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RURAL POVERTY AND THE LANDED ELITE: SOUTH ASIAN EXPERIENCE REVISITED

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Abstract

This brief paper tries to highlight two important missing aspects for understanding poverty issues in developing countries. They are the economic analysis of the rural non-farm households, and the behavior of land markets. Taking South Asia as a case, this paper claims that without proper understanding of these aspects, it is difficult to formulate an effective solution to the poverty issue.

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INTRODUCTION

The number of people living below the poverty line, using the \$1/day standard, is estimated to be around 1.2 billion. It increases to 2.8 billion, if the \$2/day is used as a yardstick, which is 47% of the total population (The World Bank 2001, IFAD 2000).

Although poverty cannot be expressed for its meaning and implications in human life by the level of consumption alone, two findings are important to us at the moment. First, as large as three-fourth of them is the rural resident. Second, 44% of the world poor is in South Asia. Our attempt at revisiting the issues of rural poverty in South Asia can be justified partly from these findings and partly from the fact that the old research findings are, unfortunately, still relevant and need to be incorporated in understanding the issues.

The poverty we are questioning is not the one in a society where the equality of social opportunity is guaranteed and a variety of options are open to its members. If this basic condition is met, we are not seriously concerned with the poor handicapped by the geographical factors unless one is forced to live in such a situation. <1> What we should be concerned with is the poverty originated from the inequitable distribution of basic social opportunity, where poverty is not simply a matter of income and consumption level, but a matter of human rights and dignity. If one's social status is determined by birth and social opportunity is not equally distributed because of the status, then this is nothing but a violation of human rights and dignity.

Fifty years have passed since many ex-colonial states gained independence. Each country has tried to be self-reliant by pursuing economic development for these years. Many industrially advanced countries and the international agencies have also made their efforts to assist the economic development process of these countries. However, in spite of all these attempts, poverty reduction has remained as one of the important policy agendas for the developing countries, international agencies and the bilateral donor countries.

Why poverty has persisted so long? After reviewing the recent literatures on poverty alleviation (IFAD 2000, The World Bank 2001), one can make quick comments on three aspects. First, although various aspects leading to poverty

are described, the structural perspectives are missing or weak. Second, prescriptions are too much bound by the market friendly approach. Third, the analysis on non-farm households and the land market behavior is absent, which seems to be serious in understanding the rural poverty in South Asia. This brief paper tries to shed lights on these two blind spots that have been paid the least attention to by those who are concerned with the poverty issues.

AGRARIAN STRUCTURE AND THE LANDED ELITE IN SOUTH ASIA

Rural Non-farm Households; the Neglected Poor

It is a simple mistake to presume that South Asian villages are composed of rural households alone whose main occupation is farming. There are a sizable number of non-farm households in every village. They are engaged in a variety of occupations, starting from barber, blacksmith and carpenter to the unskilled laborer (Table 1). They are the most important source of hired labor for farm households in rural areas (Hirashima, 1978, 86).

Three things have to be noticed. First, the magnitude of non-farm households is not negligible; non-farm/farm ratio is around 60-70% (Tables 1 and 2). Second, unlike rural Southeast Asia where there is not much social distinction between farm and non-farm households, the non-farm households in rural South Asia are distinctively segregated from the farm households and ranked at the bottom of the social hierarchy system (Hirashima, 1977, 86). Third, the non-farm households obtain income from diversified sources. Because of this multi-occupational character, a household is a much more important unit of observation and analysis than an individual (Figure 1).

In understanding rural poverty in South Asia, one cannot ignore the analysis of non-farm households. Four reasons are important. First, the non-farm households in rural South Asia are socially segregated as mentioned already, mostly landless, and thus poor. As we will discuss next, they are more handicapped in comparison with the farm households with asset position than income (Table 3). Second, because of the socially less privileged position in rural society, and because of their supportive role in farming, they have seldom been treated, and thus analyzed as an integrated economic unit of rural society. Third, they have seldom been identified as the direct policy target in the past; most of those who are in the decision making process are not from this segment of the society. Fourth, we have to notice that the non-farm households are growing faster than the farm households in absolute terms (Table 2).

The traditional socioeconomic relationship between farm and non-farm households is known as *jajmani* system in India and *seyp* system in Pakistan (Wiser, 1936, 63, Srinivas, 1987, Eglar, 1960, Hirashima 1977, 78). This is a relationship between the two, where the service rendered by a non-farm

household is compensated by a farm household in terms of farm produce per unit of work animals (a pair of bullocks). This is nothing else but a social safety net in a traditional rural society in South Asia. However, this system has been phasing out rapidly, as is well documented, in the process of commercialization of rural economy, in particular after the green revolution. In the traditional safety net system, a non-farm household adjusts the number of patron or farm household in such a way as to meet the minimum subsistence of living for his family. Also it was a customary rule among farm households at the time of employment, such as transplanting and harvesting, to place priority on those who are handicapped in income earning opportunities (e.g. widows) in the village.

The customary economy is in the process of rapid erosion. Partly because of the changing demand structure in rural and urban areas, and partly because rural people, both farm and non-farm households, have become increasingly market oriented. As a consequence, the traditional form of social safety net has been rapidly phasing out from the village communities in South Asia.

Landed Elite in Rural South Asia

It should be clear by now that the non-farm households in rural South Asia are socially distinguished from the farm households in a village. However, it should not be interpreted that they are homogeneous. They have distinguished themselves by two criteria; endogamy and the occupational ranking. Barber, blacksmith and carpenter are regarded as superior than others and sweeper and chamar (those who deal with animal skins) are commonly regarded as inferior in Pakistan Punjab. In South Asian Muslim societies also, where everyone is to be equal under the name of Allah, the social distinction is persisted in the form of occupational distinction. However, the situation in India is subtle in that the ranking of social hierarchy is influenced by the so-called 'dominant castes' and moreover, educational qualification has started influencing the rank consciousness among villagers. <2>

The farm households in rural South Asia are not homogeneous as well. Socially they are superior in all aspects from the non-farm households in a village, but the distinction among themselves is made in three ways; jati (endogamy), the size of land ownership and the status of land tenure.

To what extent is land ownership in rural South Asia skewed? Tables 4 and 5 show the pattern of land distribution in India and Pakistan. Table 4, shows 59.4% of the total holdings cultivates less than 1 hectare of land (marginal farmer) and another 18.8% of them who cultivates 1-2 hectares is classified as small farmer. In other words, approximately 80% of the total farm households cultivates one-third of total farmland. On the other hand, only 1.6% of the total farms that cultivate more than 10 hectares commands over 17.3% of land in Indian agriculture. Table 5 shows a more conspicuous picture on land distribution. It is shown that in Pakistan the farms owning more than 10 hectares

of land is about 7% of the total farm households and commands as much as 40% of farm land. Furthermore, only 2% of farms owning more than 60 hectares of land in fact controls about one-fourth of the total farmland. On the other hand, over 80% of the total farm households owning less than 5 hectares of land in average, shares 40% of total farm land in Pakistan. In this country 5 hectares of land is conceived to be a 'subsistence holding.

We can safely say that the landed elite are concerned with the top 1.6% of holdings in India and the top 2% in Pakistan. <3> They have a decisive influence not only on social and economic life of rural residents, but also on local as well as central political decision making process. Considering the difference in irrigation ratio between India (35%) and Pakistan (80%), the landed elite in Pakistan is enjoying more power than its counterpart. Let us illustrate an aspect of it by showing the socioeconomic backgrounds of the Member of National Assembly (MNA) and Provincial Assembly (MPA) in Pakistan. Tables 6 and 7 are the information collected by the interview of 95 MNA and MPA who were elected during Ayub Khan's military regime.

According to these tables, we can point out first, that all but 4 members were elected from the rural constituencies. Second, the extent of their command over land as a family is huge; 3000 acres average in the case of MNA and 1000 acres for MPA. Third, the number of villages and households under their direct or indirect control is large. The basic structure of political leadership demonstrated in these tables is still relevant nowadays, albeit the emerging representation from the business community. <4> The extent of their power in the rural area cannot be captured sufficiently even in these figures. It would be almost impossible to discuss poverty and write a prescription for its remedy unless we understand the power structure and the state of non-farm households in rural South Asia.

POVERTY ISSUE AND THE LAND MARKET IN SOUTH ASIA

Income, Assets and Employment

The poverty is currently measured in terms of the income to maintain a specified level of consumption. It is not questioned how that income is generated. In fact, for the poor, the maximization of household income up to the minimum subsistence level regardless of its sources is the most important concern. Here, the duration of work is much more important than the wage rate per se. As far as the wage rate is concerned, the wage rate of the major wage earner of a household is decisively important for the poor. In other words, the probability of other family laborers working at the wage rate below the marginal labor productivity would be less, if the income of the principal earner of a household can generate the income enough to meet the minimum requirement of subsistence for all family members. If the minimum subsistence is not met by the income of the principal earner, be it the head of the family or someone else, then

the acceptable wage rate for the rest of laborers in the family could be below their marginal productivity of labor (Hirashima, 1986).

This observation is valid for both farm and non-farm households, but more so among the poor non-farm households. This is because the probability is less for the principal earner of a non-farm household to earn the minimum subsistence level of income by traditional occupation or agricultural labor.

Let us consider the impact of agricultural growth on poverty issue for farm and non-farm households.

For the low-income group in the farming sub-sector, notably small and marginal farmers who accommodate so-called redundant family labor, technological innovation to enhance productivity is the key to increasing income and also labor absorption. This is because, in a labor surplus economy, a farm can accommodate labor up to a point where the average physical productivity is equal to the minimum subsistence level of living. An optimal level of production is determined by the nature of technological innovation and the relative price relationships. For the labor surplus farm households, all available family labor cannot be accommodated at the economically optimal point of labor input. Under this condition, the technological innovation that pushes the production function upward is the only way to enhance labor absorption at the farm level. In this context, innovations in public irrigation and bio-chemical technology have a positive employment effect, but it may not be the case of the mechanical technologies in general.

However, one should not be optimistic about the labor absorptive capacity of technological innovations for small and marginal farms. For their land base is too small for technological innovation to take care of labor absorption to the desirable extent. In order to maximize household income for the poor farmers, the surplus labor has to seek year-round employment opportunities outside the farming sector.

As for the non-farm households in a village, the productivity increase in the farming sub-sector would generate seasonal demand for their labor. However, it is a spill over effect arising from the technological innovation in the farming sub-sector and seasonal. The advocacy for the adoption of labor intensive technologies in the private farms, whatever consistent it may be in terms of resource endowment as well as factor proportion at the macro level, does not seem to be persuasive. As long as it is legally accepted to operate a large-scale farm, it is not realistic and meaningful to ask a farm cultivating 100 hectares of land, for instance, to use a pair of bullocks when a tractor is available within the permissible price range. What is more important from the point of labor absorption and labor demand for the poor rural families would be the backward and forward linkages of technological innovation in farming, rather than the direct impact of innovation on the incremental demand for farm labor (Mellor, 2000).

Now, when we discuss the poverty issue in rural South Asia, two things seem to be important. First, as mentioned already, the socioeconomic status of a member of the village community is represented not by the status of an individual, but by that of the family or the kinship group to a certain extent. Second, assets holding status is more important than income in rural area. One may question that since assets can be purchased by income, income is good enough to examine poverty and inter-personal disparity. This is wrong in two ways. First, this argument does not distinguish the rent payers and rent receivers. Second, as will be discussed next, the growth rate of assets has been much higher than the growth rate of income generated from that asset. Therefore, the argument such as the income of marginal farmers (with land) is often lower than the income of agricultural laborers (without land) and is not the right way of measuring poverty in question. The former is in a position to continuously capture the capital gain, whatever small it may be, by holding land and the land is a hedge against risk and uncertainty, as well as a collateral for raising funds for investment. On the other hand, it has been almost impossible for the latter to buy land with their agricultural labor income alone.

Relationship between Income and Assets in Agriculture

The relationship between income and assets in agriculture can be discussed in terms of the relationship between the land value and the rent generated from that land. In other words, it questions the relationship between 'stock' and 'flow' in agriculture. According to the conventional theory of rent, the relationship between the two is proportional. The 10% of increase in rent as a result of the productivity increase due to a technological innovation, for instance, is presumed to increase the land value at the same rate. Historically it has not been the case. Let us show the evidence on this point.

Suppose a landless agricultural laborer wishes to purchase land in a land market with the capital (P) borrowed by the banking institutions with interest (i). It is further supposed that he could obtain rent (R) by cultivating the land himself or rent it out to somebody. Considering the permanent character of land or no depreciation assigned to it, then the rate of return of his investment can be expressed as $R/P = r$. The minimum condition for his investment decision should be $r = i$.

It is generally expected that land price grows much faster than the growth of rent generated from the land under cultivation. Let us simply express the divergence between the two as asset effects (V), then we obtain a new R/P ratio as $R/P = r(1 - V/P)$. In other words, the conventional rent theory is valid only if $V = 0$. Then the question to ask is whether or not in the process of land market development (V) has been zeros. Figure 2 shows the historical trend of R/P ratio during the period 1890 – 1942. It is clearly shown that (V) in our notation has been positive and increasing over time. In other words, R/P ratio has never been

proportional as has been asserted by the conventional rent theory, and in fact it has been declining over the years.

The next question to ask is whether the behavior of R/P ratio was specific to the British Colonial period or not. It has been proved that the declining trend of R/P ratio is observed even today in India and Pakistan and also in Japan (Hirashima, 1996, 00). It is shown that the ratio has come down to as low as one percent or less.

One may ask whether technological innovation in farming could prevent the ratio from decreasing. The answer is yes and no. It is demonstrated elsewhere that the ratio improves when productivity increases due to the introduction of new technology such as green revolution. However, when the technology proves itself as permanent, the ratio starts following the long run declining path (Hirashima, 1996).

The declining R/P ratio or the positive and increasing asset effects (V) demonstrated in South Asia (and in Japan as well) can be interpreted in two ways. First, the rate of return of investment in land has become lower over the years. Second, the interest rate has become lower year by year since land market started functioning. The second interpretation is irrelevant; no banking institution is ready to issue loan for land purchase at the rate lower than 1%. As for the first interpretation, the behavior of (V) is important. Apart from the fact that there has been a persistent demand for land as a symbol of prestige and power, it has been influenced most heavily by the 'excess liquidity' at the micro level. The excess liquidity here means the situation in which the rent accumulated by the landed elite could not find any other investment outlets. It was natural for those who held the excess liquidity to use it for land purchase, since land was and still is the symbol of power and prestige in rural area. When the supply of land is smaller than the demand, the price has to increase. This seems to be the most important factor during the British period under study. Certainly the factors such as the increase in scarcity value due to the deterioration of land/man ratio, socioeconomic development of the region (in particular the reflection of the higher productivity of the non-agricultural sector), and also the excess liquidity at the macro level are equally important. And in fact these factors have gained more importance in recent years.

What are the implications of the analysis shown above on the poverty issue in rural South Asia? They can be summarized in the following way.

First, the fact that the ongoing interest rate is higher than the rate of return on land investment, as long as the land is used for farming. It is not possible for the prospective farmers, without initial capital at hand, to participate in the land market. In other words, land markets are open only for those who are enjoying excess liquidity in the form of rental income.

Second, the higher growth rate of land value than productivity growth implies that land value is no longer the discounted value of rent assumed in the conventional theory. This land-rent relationship has assured the continuous flow of capital gains for rent receivers and continuously squeezed the rent payers out from the land market.

Third, as long as the land market behaves as it has been in the past, the disparity among different scales of land ownership and the disparity among the land owners and the landless would not be reduced. The higher propensity to save and the higher technologies adopted by the less privileged counterparts would not produce the desirable outcome, unless land market is regulated not to be influenced by other factors than the farm productivity.

Land Reform: Magic Pill for Poverty Alleviation?

Two factors are important to form land market; private proprietorship of land and the commercial value of land ownership. Market is the basic instrument for the capitalistic framework of production. To change the state of land ownership legally established is a violation of market principle.

Land reform has been perceived as an effective means, not only to alleviate poverty, but also to enhance agricultural productivity. However, if the present state of land ownership distribution is questionable from the point of view of poverty alleviation, it is illogical to expect land market to correct its distortion. This is precisely because the present state of land distribution is nothing but the outcome of the land market development. It may be argued that the distortion is a product of feudal land system or colonial administration. Even so, it is indirectly proved that the distortion has not been corrected by the land market development. Market per se does not have a sense of direction flexible enough to meet a variety of demands.

Within the market economy, land reform should be conceived as a non-market solution to pursue certain objectives. Therefore, its characteristics and the extent of implementation are decisively influenced by the socioeconomic characteristics of the introducer (Hirashima, 1971,78, 90). The positive impacts of land reform on poverty alleviation are obvious. However, it is unrealistic to expect that the government consisting of the landed elite can introduce and implement land reform for the purpose of poverty alleviation that would eventually destroy their socioeconomic foundation of power. <5>

PROSPECTS FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION

Some Major Points

This brief paper does not claim the comprehensive treatment of poverty issues. It has been our claim that there are important missing aspects to understanding the poverty in rural South Asia. They are essentially two; the structure of non-farm households in rural area, and the characteristics of land market behavior. These aspects are important since a large number of people below the poverty line are found in rural South Asia. The following are the summary points of our assertion.

First, the majority of poor people are found in rural areas in South Asia.

Second, the villages in South Asia accommodate a high proportion of multi-occupational non-farm households.

Third, a substantial portion of the non-farm households are less privileged in terms of income, assets, social development, and are thus poor.

Fourth, the non-farm households are socially segregated from the farm households in terms of status by birth and occupations.

Fifth, it has not been made clear so far in terms of policy as to how to improve the welfare of this segment of rural population.

Sixth, a small number of landed elite have prevented the rural poor from taking advantage of social opportunities.

Seventh, enhancement of productivity through technological innovation is necessary not only to increase farm income and employment, but also to develop forward linkages in rural areas. However, it is a spill over effect for the rural non-farm households.

Eighth, through the examination of the land market development in South Asia, it has become evident that the conventional rent theory is no longer valid. Land value has historically grown much faster than the productivity. Given the behavior of land market as it is, there is not much chance for the rural poor to participate in it and thus become an owner of land.

Ninth, land reform is a non-market solution. It is illogical to expect the market to correct the situation created by itself. Therefore the nature of land reform and the extent of its implementation depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of the introducer.

Prospects for the Issue

Based on the observations and analysis of rural poverty in South Asia from aspects that have been neglected so far in policy making and academic interests, we would argue the prospects for the issue in the following manner.

First, it should be recognized that the strategy for poverty alleviation requires a persistent support at least for a generation. It would be difficult to expect the poor in an established institutional framework to get out of the poverty

trap by the short-run policy supports. The Japanese experience supports this view in that the rural poor during the pre-war period spent their meager savings to educate their children, expecting that at least their children could get out from the poverty trap. However, the important thing to note here is that the compulsory education was already introduced in 1886 in Japan and more significantly the technical education system was ready to absorb the children of the rural poor (Hirashima, 1982, 85). Formation of a skillfully devised education system is by far the most important means for poverty alleviation.

Second, it is proved that the demand for labor of the non-farm households is a function of productivity enhancement of the farm households in South Asia (Hirashima, 1978). In this context, technological innovation is essential and has to be pursued rigorously. It is not only important for the farm households, but more importantly for the non-farm households to capture the employment opportunities through the linkage effects (Mellor, 2000).

Third, the single most important role to be played by the rural sector in South Asia is to enlarge labor absorptive capacity at the moment, at least up to a point when the non-agricultural sectors start generating strong demand for labor. For the farming sector, it is achieved by increasing average productivity equivalent to the subsistence level. For the non-farming sector, the linkage effects of agricultural growth are more important. In either case, agriculture cannot be left stagnated. However, for non-farm households, agricultural growth is a necessary condition for poverty alleviation, but not a sufficient one. What is more important in this context is to maximize total household income and assets.

Fourth, the maximization of total household income is more important for the poor, because this is the only effective means to increase the degree of freedom in life for them in a society where a few landed elite dominate socioeconomic and political life. In this context, two comments are due. First, the policy bias towards the 'efficient' full timers has to be modified. From the macro objective point of view, the maximization of total value products would be the important concern, which may be more efficiently achieved by concentrating public resources and attention to a limited number of full-time large-scale farms. However, this is not the 'effective' way to enhance 'empowerment' among rural poor in South Asia. Second, it is necessary to redefine the concept of regional development, which has placed strong emphasis on the small-scale enterprises using local resources (raw materials and manpower) and local markets. However, if the maximization of the total income for the rural poor is the target, then all the binding restrictions are unnecessary. Relocation of large-scale firms or their branches should not be discouraged as long as they are labor absorptive. However, in that case, development of the social sector is a prerequisite for the region to invite such firms with qualified manpower.

Fifth, regional development for the non-farm households can be accelerated by the public investment 'in' and 'for' agriculture (Dantwala, 1986). Given the

growing regional disparity in South Asia, it is necessary to redirect public investment to the less privileged but high potential regions (Hirashima, 2000). One may question that the landed elite of the region can capture the fruits of such investment as well. It is highly plausible. However, it would serve the purpose of reducing the existing regional disparity in general, and also improving the absolute level of living of the rural poor in that region, however modest it may be.

Sixth, to be more specific to the non-farm households in South Asia, three avenues seem to be opened. First, to link with foreign labor markets. However, it is well known that this income earning opportunity cannot be captured by the poorest of the poor, since the agents dealing with international migration demand cash outlay unaffordable for the poor. Second, to keep livestock for dairy production. Here the bottleneck is the least developed fodder market for the landless poor (Hirashima, 1978, Kurosaki, 1998). Third, to seek employment in the non-agricultural sector. This is the most feasible avenue for the non-farm households, since the probability of participating in the land market and becoming a farmer is remote, under the given land market behavior, unless non-agricultural income is brought in.

Seventh, in more general and practical terms, it is urgent to solve absolute poverty situations than to deal with relative poverty. As pointed out, land market does not have a capacity to adjust itself to the changing demands. Therefore, 'market friendly land reform' is an irrelevant proposition. Non-market solution requires a strong political will. None of these measures seem to be realistic at the moment. However, it is possible to regulate land market in such a way as to minimize the growth of capital gains out of holding land and to accelerate land sales by tax reform.

Notes and References

NOTES

<1> In the *World Development Report*, geographic isolation is counted as one of the major poverty traps. However, it implies simply that the social development is costly in remote places. There are many places where the education is disseminated in remote mountain regions. What is important is the social opportunity, not a location per se (*World Development Report 2001*, p.124).

<2> In the thesis of 'dominant caste', Prof. Srinivas places the importance of the dominant castes in a village community in India rather than the traditionally defined caste hierarchy. However, in Pakistan, the absolute superiority of farming community over non-farming community is observed. And among farming community, the ranking based on *jati* seems to be dominated; Rajput, Jat and Arain (Srinivas (1987), Baden-Powel (1892, 1985)).

<3> It is a general impression that the large-scale efficient farms symbolize the US agriculture. However, it should be interesting to note that out of 2.3 million farm households, about 56% of them were small part-time farms who produced only 2% of the total farm products, while 2% of large farms produced half of the sales of farm products in 1977. Furthermore, on average, 90% of farm households' income came from off-farm sources in 1999. The skewed distribution of land and production in US agriculture as much as in South Asia has not been questioned. This is because the small number of large farms are the most efficient farms and they have seldom been major players in politics (USDA, 2000).

<4> According to the two books (Mushtaq Ahmad, 1988 and Omar Norman, 1988) examining the social characteristics of political leaders in Pakistan, the proportion of landlord was 70% in 1955, 40% in 1965, 45% in 1971 and 66% in 1985. However, the authors neither examined their respective constituencies, nor their secondary occupations and asset position in particular land ownership. It is difficult to capture the image of landed elite in Pakistan with this methodology. In fact, as shown already, most of the political leaders whom I personally interviewed were land based and had secondary professions, notably lawyers. Although the pure urban-based politicians have been increasing over time, yet the majority of them are the second and third generations of those in 1961.

<5> *World Development Report 2001* rightly pointed out the importance of access to land. "One of the glaring manifestations of inequality is in access to land. In most developing countries large inequalities in land ownership make it virtually impossible for poor people to rise from the bottom of the agrarian hierarchy" (p.123). Yet, the report believes the solution lies in land reform and the broader efforts to diversity economic opportunities (p.123). In fact, the report sited the challenge of the middle-size farmers using government supports against landed elite. It is an encouraging story. However, this is just a few cases and moreover, the poor non-farm households are again lost sight of.

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Table 1
Non-Farm Households and their Traditional Occupations
Four Villages in Pakistan: 1971-72

Traditional Occupations	<u>Name of Village</u>				Total
	A	B	C	D	
Tarkhan (Carpenter)	3	1	1	1	6
Lohar (Blacksmith)	1	1	3	1	6
Nai (Barber)	3	3	2	3	11
Mochi (Cobbler)	3	2	2	4	11
Qasai (Butcher)	1	0	1	1	3
Mussali (Laborer)	3	0	0	2	5
Julaha (Weaver)	4	10	2	0	16
Kumhar (Pot maker)	9	2	2	3	16
Isai (Christian)	3	12	11	0	26
Machi (Bakery)	7	0	2	2	11
Dhobi (Washerman)	1	0	0	0	1
Mirasi (Musician)	3	4	1	0	8
Kashmiri (Laborer)	3	0	0	0	3
Faqir (Begger)	1	0	0	0	1
Moulvi (Priest)	1	0	1	0	2
Sonar (Goldsmith)	1	0	0	0	1
Darzi (Tailor)	1	0	1	1	3
Teli (Oil crusher)	0	2	0	3	5
Chaoqidar (Night guard)	0	0	1	0	1
Dindar (Laborer)	0	0	1	0	1
Sheikh (Laborer)	0	0	0	3	3
Chamar (Hide & Skin)	0	0	0	1	1
Others (Laborer)	0	2	1	0	3
Non-farm Households	46	39	34	25	144
Farm-Households	52	75	57	54	238
Non-farm/Farm Ratio	0.88	0.52	0.6	0.46	0.61

Source: Extracted from Hirashima (1977)

Table 2
Rural Population and Agricultural Workers: India

	1971	1981	1991
1. Population (million)	548.9	685.2	844.3
2. Rural population(%)	80.1	76.7	74.3
3. Farming population	78.3	92.5	110.6
4. Agricultural laborer	47.5	55.5	74.6
5. Others	54.7	96.6	100.2
6. (4)/(3)	0.61	0.6	0.68

Source: GOI, *Agr. Statistics at a Glance*, 1992

Table 3
Income and Assets of Farm and Non-farm Households

	4 Villages in Pakistan Punjab (1971-72)		(Owner farmer = 100)	
	Income (Per adult labor unit)	Assets	Income (Per household)	Assets
Landlord*	135.5	141.5	125	130.5
Owner farmer	100	100	100	100
Part-owner	101.6	92.4	110	100
Tenant farmer	39.5	5.6	48.4	6.9
Absentee landlord	93	100	63.2	67.9
Christian**	45.5	2.2	48.7	2.4
Cobbler	24.4	2.9	26.3	3.1
Weaver	37.8	2.8	27.2	2
Barber	37.1	4.6	29.5	3.7
Cobbler	34.7	3.4	26.1	2.6
Bakery	29.7	3.8	23.6	3
Mirasi**	22.6	1.7	19.2	1.4
Carpenter	25.9	6.1	23.5	5.6
Blacksmith	21	3.2	25.5	3.9
Mussali**	22.8	2.4	17.7	1.9
Oil extraction	25.9	2	18.2	1.4
Butcher	17.5	1.5	19.8	1.6
Tailor	51.2	3	33.2	2
Kashmiri**	41.1	5.9	29.1	4.2
Sheikh**	22.2	2	28.7	2.6
Priest	85.4	7.5	41.5	3.6

Note: ** laborer Assets = Present value of land, livestock, buildings and machinery

Source: Extracted from Hirashima (1977)

Table 4
Distribution of Operational Holdings in India

	Number of Farms		Operational Holdings (1000 ha)	
	1980-81	1990-91	1980-81	1990-91
Marginal farmer (Less than 1 ha)	50,122 56.40%	63,389 59.40%	19,735 12.10%	24,894 15.10%
Small farmer (1 - 2 ha)	16,072 18.10%	20,092 18.80%	23,169 14.10%	28,824 17.40%
Medium-small farmer (2-4 ha)	12,455 14%	13,923 13.10%	34,645 21.10%	38,375 23.20%
Medium farmer (4 - 10 ha)	8,068 9.10%	7,580 7.10%	48,543 29.60%	45,752 27.10%
Large farmer (More than 10 ha)	2,166 2.40%	1,654 1.60%	37,705 23.00%	28,659 17.30%

Source: GOI, *Agr. Statistics at a Glance* (1992, 1999)

Table 5
Pattern of Land Ownership in Pakistan: 1990

	Number of Farms		Land Owned	
	(million)	%	(million)	%
Less than 0.5 ha	0.68	13	0.19	1
0.5 - 1.0 ha	0.69	14	0.51	3
1.0 - 2.0 ha	1.04	20	1.45	8
2.0 - 3.0 ha	0.84	17	1.97	10
3.0 - 5.0 ha	0.86	17	3.31	17
5.0 - 10.0 ha	0.62	12	4.13	22
10.0 - 20.0 ha	0.24	5	3.03	16
20.0 - 60.0 ha	0.09	2	2.61	14
More than 60 ha	0.02	*	1.94	10

* less than 0.5%

Source: GOP, *Economic Survey*, 1997

Table 6
**Occupational Distribution of Members of National
and Provincial Assemblies: 1961**

	Below BA	Above BA	Total
Full-time Agriculture	31	7	38
Agriculture/Business	8	5	13
Agri./Business/Lawyer	0	1	1
Agri./Manufacture	5	5	10
Agri./Manufacture/Lawyer	0	3	3
Agriculture/Lawyer	1	16	17
Agriculture/Government	1	1	2
Agri./Manufacture/Gov't	0	1	1
Agri./Lawyer/Government	0	1	1
Agriculture/Military	2	1	3
Agri./Business/Gov't	0	2	2
Business	1	2	3
Lawyer	0	1	1
Total	49	46	95


Source: Hirashima (1964)

Table 7
Socioeconomic Background of MNA and MPA in Pakistan

	MNA (Number)	MPA Total/ (Number)	Average (No. Acre, Village)
Land Ownership			
Less than 100 acres	8	9	17
100 - 400 acres	7	5	12
400 - 1000 acres	13	15	28
1000 - 5000 acres	12	11	23
More than 5000 acres	5	1	6
Land holding per Member	3,362.00	1107	2287
Command Village per Member	3.3	3	3.1
Dependant Farms per Member	324	87	211


Source: Hirashima (1964)

Figure 1 Multi-Occupational Structure of the Non-Farm Households in Punjab, 1971



Source: S. Hirashima (1978)

Figure 2 Trend of R/P Ratio in Punjab; 1890-1942



Source: S. Hirashima (2000)